On Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Turn-Based Reachability Timed Games by Brihaye, Thomas & Goeminne, Aline
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
10
49
1v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
8 J
un
 20
20
On Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Turn-Based
Reachability Timed Games⋆
Thomas Brihaye1 and Aline Goeminne1,2
1 Universite´ de Mons (UMONS), Mons Belgium
{thomas.brihaye,aline.goeminne}@umons.ac.be
2 Universite´ libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium
Abstract. We study multiplayer turn-based timed games with reacha-
bility objectives. In particular, we are interested in the notion of subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE). We prove that deciding the constrained exis-
tence of an SPE in this setting is EXPTIME-complete.
Keywords: multiplayer turn-based timed games · reachability objec-
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1 Introduction
Games In the context of reactive systems, two-player zero-sum games played on
graphs are commonly used to model the purely antagonistic interactions between
a system and its environment [18]. The system and the environment are the two
players of a game played on a graph whose vertices represent the configurations.
Finding how the system can ensure the achievement of his objective amounts to
finding, if it exists, a winning strategy for the system.
When modeling complex systems with several agents whose objectives are not
necessarily antagonistic, the two-player zero-sum framework is too restrictive and
we rather rely on multiplayer non zero-sum games. In this setting, the notion
of winning strategy is replaced by various notions of equilibria including the
famous concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [16]. When considering games played
on graphs, the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is often preferred to
the classical Nash equilibrium [17]. Indeed, Nash equilibrium does not take into
account the sequential structure of the game and may allow irrational behaviors
in some subgames.
Timed games Timed automata [19] is now a well established model for com-
plex systems including real time features. Timed automata have been naturally
extended into two-player zero-sum timed games [2,11,4,15]. Multiplayer non zero-
sum extensions have also been considered [5,7]. In these models both time and
multiplayer aspects coexist. In this non zero-sum timed framework, the main
focus has been on NE, and, to our knowledge, not on SPE.
⋆ This work is supported by the ARC project “Non-Zero Sum Game Graphs: Appli-
cations to Reactive Synthesis and Beyond” (Fe´de´ration Wallonie-Bruxelles).
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Main contributions and organization of the paper. In this paper, we con-
sider multiplayer, non zero-sum, turn-based timed games with reachability objec-
tives together with the concept of SPE. We focus on the constrained existence
problem (for SPE): given a timed game, we want to decide whether there exists
an SPE where some players have to win and some other ones have to lose. The
main result of this paper is a proof that the SPE constrained existence problem
is EXPTIME-complete for reachability timed games. Let us notice that the NE
constrained existence problem for reachability timed games is also EXPTIME-
complete [7]. This may look surprising as often, there is a complexity jump when
going from NE to SPE, for example the constrained existence problem on qual-
itative reachability game is NP-complete for NE [12] and PSPACE-complete for
SPE [8]. Intuitively, the complexity jump is avoided because the exponential
blow up due to the passage from SPE to NE is somehow absorbed by the clas-
sical exponential blow up due to the classical region graph used for the analysis
of timed system.
In order to obtain an EXPTIME algorithm, we proceed in different steps.
In the first step, we prove that the game variant of the classical region graph
is a good abstraction for the SPE constrained existence problem. In fact, we
identify conditions on bisimulations under which the study of SPE of a given
(potentially infinite game) can be reduced to the study of its quotient. This is
done in Section 3 for (untimed) games with general objectives. In Section 4,
we then focus on (untimed) finite reachability game and provide an EXPTIME
algorithm to solve the constrained existence problem. Proving this result may
look surprising, as we already know from [8] that this problem is indeed PSPACE-
complete for (untimed) finite games. However the PSPACE algorithm provided
in [8] did not allow us to obtain the EXPTIME algorithm for timed games. The
latter EXPTIME algorithm is discussed in Section 5.
Related works There are many results on SPEs played on graphs, we refer the
reader to [10] for a survey and an extended bibliography. Here we focus on the
results directly related to our contributions. The constrained existence of SPEs is
studied in finite multiplayer turn-based games with different kinds of objectives,
for example: (qualitative) reachability and safety objectives [8], ω-regular win-
ning conditions [20], quantitative reachability objectives [9],... In [5], they prove
that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria in concurrent timed
games with reachability objectives is EXPTIME-complete. This same problem
in the same setting is studied in [7] with others qualitative objectives.
2 Preliminaries
Transition systems, bisimulations and quotients A transition system is a
tuple T = (Σ, V,E) where (i) Σ is a finite alphabet; (ii) V a set of states (also
called vertices) and (iii) E ⊆ V ×Σ ×V a set of transitions (also called edges).
To ease the notation, an edge (v1, a, v2) ∈ E is sometimes denoted by v1
a
−→ v2.
Notice that V may be uncontable. We said that the transition system is finite if
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V and E are finite.
Given two transition systems on the same alphabet T1 = (Σ, V1, E1) and
T2 = (Σ, V2, E2), a simulation of T1 by T2 is a binary relation R ⊆ V1 × V2
which satisfies the following conditions: (i) ∀v1, v′1 ∈ V1, ∀v2 ∈ V2 and ∀a ∈ Σ:
((v1, v2) ∈ R and v1
a
−→1 v′1) ⇒ (∃v
′
2 ∈ V2, v2
a
−→2 v′2 and (v
′
1, v
′
2) ∈ R) and (ii)
for each v1 ∈ V1 there exists v2 ∈ V2 such that (v1, v2) ∈ R. We say that T2
simulates T1. It implies that any transition v1
a
−→1 v′1 in T1 is simulated by a
corresponding transition v2
a
−→2 v′2 in T2.
Given two transition systems on the same alphabet T1 = (Σ, V1, E1) and
T2 = (Σ, V2, E2), a bisimulation between T1 and T2 is a binary relation R ⊆
V1 × V2 such that R is a simulation of T1 by T2 and the converse relation R
−1
is a simulation of T2 by T1 where R
−1 = {(v2, v1) ∈ V2 × V1 | (v1, v2) ∈ R}.
When R is a bisimulation between two transition systems, we write β instead
of R. If T = (Σ, V,E) is a transition system, a bisimulation on V × V is called
a bisimulation on T .
Given a transition system T = (Σ, V,E) and an equivalence relation ∼ on
V , we define the quotient of T by ∼, denoted by T˜ = (Σ, V˜ , E˜), as follows: (i)
V˜ = {[v]∼ | v ∈ V } where [v]∼ = {v′ ∈ V | v ∼ v′} and (ii) [v1]∼
a
−→∼ [v2]∼ if
and only if there exist v′1 ∈ [v1]∼ and v
′
2 ∈ [v2]∼ such that v
′
1
a
−→ v′2. When clear
from the context which equivalence relation is used, we write [v] instead of [v]∼.
Given a transition system T = (Σ, V,E), a bisimulation ∼ on T which is also
an equivalence relation is called a bisimulation equivalence. In this context, the
following result holds.
Lemma 1. Given a transition system T and a bisimulation equivalence ∼, there
exists a bisimulation ∼q between T and its quotient T˜ . This bisimulation is given
by the function ∼q: V → V˜ : v 7→ [v]∼
Turn-based games
Arenas, plays and histories An arena A = (Σ, V,E,Π, (Vi)i∈Π) is a tuple where
(i) T = (Σ, V,E) is a transition system such that for each v ∈ V , there exists
a ∈ Σ and v′ ∈ V such that (v, a, v′) ∈ E; (ii) Π = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set
of players and (iii) (Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V between the players. An arena is
finite if its transition sytem T is finite.
A play in A is an infinite path in its transition system, i.e., ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω
is a play if for each i ∈ N, there exists a ∈ Σ such that (ρi, a, ρi+1) ∈ E. A history
h in A can be defined in the same way but h = h0 . . . hk ∈ V ∗ for some k ∈ N is
a finite path in the transition system. We denote the set of plays by Plays and
the set of histories by Hist. When it is necessary, we use the notation PlaysA
and HistA to recall the underlying arena A. Moreover, the set Histi is the set of
histories such that their last vertex v is a vertex of Player i, i.e., v ∈ Vi. A play
(resp. a history) in (G, v0) is then a play (resp. a history) in G starting in v0.
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The set of such plays (resp. histories) is denoted by Plays(v0) (resp. Hist(v0)).
We also use the notation Histi(v0) when these histories end in a vertex v ∈ Vi.
Given a play ρ ∈ Plays and k ∈ N, its suffix ρkρk+1 . . . is denoted by ρ≥k. We
denote by Succ(v) = {v′|(v, a, v′) ∈ E for some a ∈ Σ} the set of successors of v,
for v ∈ V , and by Succ∗ the transitive closure of Succ. Given a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . .,
the set Occ(ρ) = {v ∈ V | ∃k, ρk = v} is the set of vertices visited along ρ.
Remark 1. When we consider a play in an arena A = (Σ, V,E,Π, (Vi)i∈Π), we
do not care about the alphabet letter associated with each edge of the play.
It is the reason why two different infinite paths in T = (Σ, V,E) v0
a
−→ v1
a
−→
. . .
a
−→ vn
a
−→ . . . and v0
b
−→ v1
b
−→ . . .
b
−→ vn
b
−→ . . . correspond to only one play
ρ = v0v1 . . . vn . . . in A. The same phenomenon appears with finite paths and
histories. We explain later why this is not a problem for our purpose.
Multiplayer turn-based game An (initialized multiplayer Boolean turn-based)
game is a tuple (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π) such that: (i) A = (Σ, V,E,Π, (Vi)i∈Π) is
an arena; (ii) v0 ∈ V is the initial vertex and (iii) for each i ∈ Π , gi : Plays→
{0, 1} is a gain function for Player i. In this setting, each player i ∈ Π is equipped
with a set Ωi ⊆ Plays that we call the objective of Player i. Thus, for each i ∈ Π ,
for each ρ ∈ Plays: gi(ρ) = 1 if and only if ρ ∈ Ωi. If gi(ρ) = 1 (resp. = 0),
we say that Player i wins (resp. loses) along ρ. In the sequel of this document,
we refer to the notion of initialized multiplayer Boolean turn-based game by the
term “game”. For each ρ ∈ Plays, we write g(ρ) = p for some p ∈ {0, 1}|Π| to
depict gi(ρ) = pi for each i ∈ Π .
Strategies and outcomes Given a game (G, v0), a strategy of Player i is a function
σi : Histi(v0) → V with the constraint that for each hv ∈ Histi(v0), σi(hv) ∈
Succ(v). A play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is consistent with σi if for each ρk such that ρk ∈ Vi,
ρk+1 = σi(ρ0 . . . ρk). A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π is a tuple of stratgies, one for
each player. Given a game (G, v0) and a strategy profile σ, there exists a unique
play from v0 consistent with each strategy σi. We call this play the outcome of
σ and denote it by 〈σ〉v0 .
Remark 2. We follow up Remark 1. The objectives we consider are of the form
Ω ⊆ Plays. These objectives only depend on the sequence of visited states along a
play (for example: visiting infinitely often a given state) regardless the sequence
of visited alphabet letters. This is why defining the strategy of a player by a
choice of the next vertex instead of a couple of an alphabet letter and a vertex
is not a problem. Actually, in all this paper one may consider that the alphabet
is Σ = {a}. The reason why we allow alphabet on edge is to be able to consider
synchronous products of (timed) automata [3,19]. In this way, we could consider
wider class of objectives (see Section 5.4).
Subgame perfect equilibria In the multiplayer game setting, the solution
concepts usually studied are equilibria (see [13]). We here recall the concepts of
Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Let σ = (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in a game (G, v0). When we highlight the
role of Player i, we denote σ by (σi, σ−i) where σ−i is the profile (σj)j∈Π\{i} . A
strategy σ′i 6= σi is a deviating strategy of Player i, and it is a profitable deviation
for him if gi(〈σ〉v0 ) < gi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0). A strategy profile σ in a game (G, v0) is a
Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from
his strategy, i.e., no player has a profitable deviation.
A refinement of NE is the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
which is a strategy profile being an NE in each subgame. Formally, given a game
(G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π) and a history hv ∈ Hist(v0), the game (G↾h, v) is called
a subgame of (G, v0) such that G↾h = (A, (gi↾h)i∈Π) and gi↾h(ρ) = gi(hρ) for
all i ∈ Π and ρ ∈ V ω. Notice that (G, v0) is subgame of itself. Moreover if σi
is a strategy for Player i in (G, v0), then σi↾h denotes the strategy in (G↾h, v)
such that for all histories h′ ∈ Histi(v), σi↾h(h′) = σi(hh′). Similarly, from a
strategy profile σ in (G, v0), we derive the strategy profile σ↾h in (G↾h, v). Let
(G, v0) be a game, following this formalism, a strategy profile σ is a subgame
perfect equilibrium in (G, v0) if for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), σ↾h is an NE in (G↾h, v).
Studied problem Given a game (G, v0), several SPEs may coexist. It is the
reason why we are interested in the constrained existence of an SPE in this game:
some players have to win and some other ones have to lose. The related decision
problem is the following one:
Definition 1 (Constrained existence problem). Given a game (G, v0) and
two gain profiles x, y ∈ {0, 1}|Π|, does there exist an SPE σ in (G, v0) such that
x ≤ g(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ y.
3 SPE in a game and its quotient
In this section, we first define the concept of bisimulation between games (resp.
bisimulation on a game). Then, we explain how given such bisimulations we can
obtain a new game, called the quotient game, thanks to a quotient of the initial
game. Finally, we prove that if there exists an SPE in a game with a given gain
profile, there exists an SPE in its associated quotient game with the same gain
profile, and vice versa.
3.1 Game bisimulation
We extend the notion of bisimulation between transition systems (resp. on a
transition system) to the one of bisimulation between games (resp. on a game).
In this paper, by bisimulation between games (resp. on a game) we mean:
Definition 2 (Game bisimulation). Given two games (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π)
and (G′, v′0) = (A
′, (g′i)i∈Π) with the same alphabet and the same set of players,
we say that ∼⊆ V × V ′ is a bisimulation between (G, v0) and (G′, v′0) if (i) ∼
is a bisimulation between T = (Σ, V,E) and T ′ = (Σ, V ′, E′) and (ii) v0 ∼ v′0.
In the same way, if ∼⊆ V × V we say that ∼ is a bisimulation on (G, v0) if ∼
is a bisimulation on T = (Σ, V,E).
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The notion of bisimulation equivalence on a transition system is extended
in the same way to games. In the rest of this document, we use the following
notations: (1) If ∼⊆ V × V ′ is a bisimulation between (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈) and
(G′, v′0) = (A
′, (g′i)i∈), for each ρ ∈ PlaysA and for all ρ
′ ∈ PlaysA′ , we write
ρ ∼ ρ′ if and only if for each n ∈ N: ρn ∼ ρ′n. (2) If ∼⊆ V × V is a bisimulation
on (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈) , for each ρ ∈ PlaysA and for all ρ
′ ∈ PlaysA, we write
ρ ∼ ρ′ if and only if for each n ∈ N: ρn ∼ ρ′n. (3) Notations 1 and 2 can be
naturally adapted to histories3.
A natural property that should be satisfied by a bisimulation on a game is
the respect of the vertices partition. It means that if a vertex bisimulates an
other vertex, then these vertices should be owned by the same player.
Definition 3 (∼ respects the partition). Given a game (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π)
and a bisimulation ∼ on (G, v0), we say that ∼ respects the partition if for all
v, v′ ∈ V such that v ∼ v′, if v ∈ Vi then v′ ∈ Vi.
3.2 Quotient game
Given a game (G, v0) and a bisimulation equivalence ∼ on it which respects the
partition, one may consider its associated quotient game (G˜, [v0]) such that its
transition system is defined as the quotient of the transition system of (G, v0).
Definition 4 (Quotient game). Given a game (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) such that
A = (Σ, V,E,Π, (Vi)i∈Π), if ∼ is a bisimulation equivalence on (G, v0) which
respects the partition, the associated quotient game (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π) is
defined as follows: (i) A˜ = (Σ, V˜ , E˜, (V˜i)i∈Π) is such that T˜ = (Σ, V˜ , E˜) is the
quotient of T and, for each i ∈ Π, [v] ∈ V˜i if and only if v ∈ Vi and (ii) for each
i ∈ Π, g˜i : PlaysA˜ → {0, 1} is the gain fonction of Player i.
In order to preserve some equivalent properties between a game and its quo-
tient game, the equivalence relation on the game should respect the gain func-
tions in both games. It means that if we consider two bisimulated plays either
both in the game itself or one in the game and the other one in its quotient
game, the gain profile of these plays should be equal.
Definition 5 (∼ respects the gain functions). Given an initialized game
(G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) such that A = (Σ, V,E,Π, (Vi)i∈Π) and a bisimulation
equivalence ∼ on (G, v0), we say that ∼ respects the gain functions if the follow-
ing properties hold: (i) for each ρ and ρ′ in Plays, if ρ ∼ ρ′ then g(ρ) = g(ρ′)
and (ii) for each ρ ∈ PlaysA and ρ˜ ∈ PlaysA˜, if ρ ∼q ρ˜ then g(ρ) = g˜(ρ˜).
3 Once again, with this convention it is possible that two plays (or histories) such that
ρ ∼ ρ′ do not preserve the sequence of alphabet letters as it should be when we clas-
sicaly consider bisimulated paths in two bisimulated transitions systems. Remark 2
explains why it is not a problem for us.
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3.3 Existence of SPE
The aim of this section is to prove that, if there exists an SPE in a game equipped
with a bisimilation equivalence which respects the partition and the gain func-
tions, there exists an SPE in its associated quotient game with the same gain
profile, and vice versa.
Theorem 1. Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) be a game and (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π)
its associated quotient game where ∼ is a bisimulation equivalence on (G, v0).
If ∼ respects the partition and the gain functions, we have that: there exists an
SPE σ in (G, v0) such that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p if and only if there exists an SPE τ in
(G˜, [v0]) such that g˜(〈τ〉[v0 ]) = p.
The key idea is to prove that: if there exists an SPE in a game equipped with
a bisimulation equivalence, there exists an SPE in this game which is uniform
and with the same gain profile. If σi is an uniform strategy, each time we consider
two histories h ∼ h′, the choices of Player i taking into account h or h′ are in
the same equivalence class.
Definition 6. Let (G, v0) be a game and ∼ a bisimulation on it, we say that the
strategy σi is uniform if for all h, h
′ ∈ Histi(v0) such that h ∼ h′, we have that
σi(h) ∼ σi(h′). A strategy profile σ is uniform if for all i ∈ Π, σi is uniform.
Proposition 1. Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) be a game and ∼ be a bisimulation
equivalence on (G, v0) which respects the partition and such that for each ρ and
ρ′ in Plays, if ρ ∼ ρ′ then g(ρ) = g(ρ′), there exists an SPE σ in (G, v0) such
that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p if and only if there exists an SPE τ in (G, v0) which is uniform
and such that g(〈τ〉v0 ) = p.
4 Reachability games
In this section we focus on a particular kind of game called reachability game. In
these games, each player has a subset of vertices that he wants to reach. First,
we formally define the concepts of reachability games and reachability quotient
games. Then, we provide an algorithm which solves the constrained existence
problem in finite reachability games in time complexity at most exponential in
the number of players and polynomial in the size of the transition system of the
game.
4.1 Reachability games and quotient reachability games
Definition 7. A reachability game (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π) is a game
where each player i ∈ Π is equipped with a target set Fi that he wants to reach.
Formally, the objective of Player i is Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | Occ(ρ) ∩ Fi 6= ∅} where
Fi ⊆ V . This is a reachability objective.
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Given a reachability game (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π, (Fi)i∈Π) and a bisimulation
equivalence ∼ on this game which respects the partition, one may consider its
quotient game (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π , (F˜i)i∈Π) where for each i ∈ Π , F˜i ⊆ V˜ .
In attempts to ensure the respect of the gain functions by ∼, we add a natural
property on ∼ (see Definition 8) and define the sets F˜i in a proper way. In the
rest of this paper, we assume that this property is satisfied and that the quotient
game of a reachability game is defined as in Definition 9.
Definition 8 (∼ respects the target sets). Let (G, v0) be a reachability game
and ∼ be a bisimulation equivalence on this game, we say that ∼ respects the
target sets if for all v ∈ V and for all v′ ∈ V such that v ∼ v′: v ∈ Fi ⇔ v
′ ∈ Fi).
Definition 9 (Reachability quotient game). Given a reachability game
(G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π, (Fi)i∈Π) and a bisimulation equivalence ∼ on this game
which respects the partition and the target sets, its quotient game is the reacha-
bility game (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π , (F˜i)i∈Π) where F˜i = {[v]∼ | v ∈ Fi} for each
i ∈ Π. We call this game the reachability quotient game.
Lemma 2. Let (G, v0) be a reachability game and let ∼ be a bisimulation equiv-
alence which respects the target sets on this game, ∼ respects the gain fonctions.
4.2 Complexity results
It is proved that the constrained existence problem is PSPACE-complete in finite
reachability game [8]. Our final purpose is to obtain an EXPTIME algorithm for
the constrained existence problem on reachability timed games (see Section 5).
Naively applying the PSPACE algorithm of [8] to the region games would lead
to an EXPSPACE algorithm. That is why we provide here an alternative EXP-
TIME algorithm to solve the constrained existence problem on (untimed) finite
games. This new algorithm will have the advantage to have a running time at
most exponential only in the number of players (and polynomial in the size
of its transition system). This feature will be crucial to obtain the EXPTIME
algorithm on timed games.
Theorem 2. Given a finite reachability game (G, v0), the constrained existence
problem can be solved by an algorithm whose time complexity is at most expo-
nential in |Π | and polynomial in the size of its transition system.
This approach follows the proof for quantitative reachability games in [9]. This
latter proof relies on two key ingredients: (i) the extended game of a reachability
game and (ii) an SPE outcome characterization based on a fixpoint computation
of a labeling function of the states. Those two key ingredients will be defined
below. Further technical details can be found in [9] for the quantitative case.
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Extended game Let (G, v0) be finite a reachability game, its associated ex-
tended game (X , x0) = (X, (gXi )i∈Π , (F
X
i )i∈Π) is the reachability game such
that the vertices are enriched with the set of players that have already visited
their target sets along a history. The arena X = (Σ, V X , EX , Π, (V Xi )i∈Π) is
defined as follows: (i) V X = V × 2Π ; (ii) ((v, I), a, (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX if and only
if (v, a, v′) ∈ E and I ′ = I ∪ {i ∈ Π | v′ ∈ Fi}; (iii) (v, I) ∈ V Xi if and only
if v ∈ Vi; (iv) (v, I) ∈ FXi if and only if i ∈ I and (v) x0 = (v0, I0) where
I0 = {i ∈ Π | v0 ∈ Fi}.
The construction of (X , x0) from (G, v0) causes an exponential blow-up of
the number of states. The main idea of this construction is that if you consider a
play ρ = (v0, I0)(v1, I1) . . . (vn, In) . . . ∈ PlaysX(x0) , the set In means that each
player i ∈ In has visited his target set along ρ0 . . . ρn. The important points
are that there is a one-to-one correspondance between plays in PlaysA(v0) and
PlaysX(x0) and that the gain profiles of two corresponding plays beginning in
the initial vertices are equal. From these observations, we have:
Proposition 2. Let (G, v0) be a reachability game and (X , x0) be its associated
extended game, let p ∈ {0, 1}|Π| be a gain profile, there exists an SPE σ in (G, v0)
with gain profile p if and only if there exists an SPE τ in (X , x0) with gain profile
p.
In the rest of this section, we will write v ∈ V X (instead of (u, I)) and we
depict by I(v) the set I of the players who have already visited their target set.
Outcome characterization Once this extended game is build, we want a way
to decide whether a play in this game corresponds to the outcome of an SPE
or not: we want an SPE outcome characterization. The vertices of the extended
game are labeled thanks to a labeling function λ∗ : V X → {0, 1}. For a vertex
v ∈ V X such that v ∈ V Xi , the value 1 imposes that Player i should reach his
target set if he follows an SPE from v and the value 0 does not impose any
constraint on the gain of Player i from v.
The labeling function λ∗ is obtained thanks to an iterative procedure such
that each step k of the iteration provides a λk-labeling function. This procedure
is based on the notion of λ-consistent play: that is a play which sastifies the
constraints given by λ all along it.
Definition 10. Let λ : V X → {0, 1} be a labeling function and ρ ∈ PlaysX,
we say that ρ is λ-consistent if for each i ∈ Π and for each n ∈ N such that
ρn ∈ V Xi : g
X
i (ρ≥n) ≥ λ(ρn). We write ρ |= λ.
The iterative computation of the sequence (λk)k∈N works as follows: (i) at
step 0, for each v ∈ V X , λ0(v) = 0, (ii) at step k + 1, for each v ∈ V X , by
assuming that v ∈ V Xi , λ
k+1(v) = maxv′∈Succ(v)min{g
X
i (ρ) | ρ ∈ PlaysX(v
′) ∧
ρ |= λk} and (iii) we stop when we find n ∈ N such that for each v ∈ V X ,
λn+1(v) = λn(v). The least natural number k∗ which satisfies (iii) is called the
fixpoint of (λk)k∈N and λ
∗ is defined as λk
∗
. The following lemma states that
this natural number exists and so that the iterative procedure stops.
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Lemma 3. The sequence (λk)k∈N reaches a fixpoint in k
∗ ∈ N. Moreover, k∗ is
at most equal to |V | · 2|Π|.
Proof (Proof sketch). In the initialization step, all the vertex values are equal
to 0. Then at each iteration, (i) if the value of a vertex was equal to 1 in the
previous step, then it stays equal to 1 all along the procedure and (ii) if the value
of the vertex was equal to 0 then it either stays equal to 0 (for this iteration
step) or it becomes equal to 1 (for all the next steps thanks to (i)). At each step,
at least one vertex value changes and when no value changes the procedure has
reached a fixpoint which corresponds to the values of λ∗. Thus, it means that
λ∗ is obtained in at most |V | × 2|Π| steps.
As claimed in the following proposition, the labeling function λ∗ exactly
caracterizes the set of SPE outcomes. The proof is quite the same as for the
quantitative setting ([9]).
Proposition 3. Let (X , x0) be the extended game of a finite reachability game
(G, v0) and let ρX ∈ PlaysX(x0) be a play, there exists an SPE σ with outcome
ρX in (X , x0) if and only if ρX is λ∗-consistent.
Complexity Proposition 3 allows us to prove Theorem 2. Indeed, we only have
to find a play in the extended game which is λ∗-consistent and with a gain profile
which satisfies the constrained given by the decision problem.
Proof (Proof sketch of Theorem 2). Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈Π, (Fi)i∈Π) be a reach-
ability game and let (X , x0) = (X, (gXi )i∈Π , (F
X
i )i∈Π) be its associated extended
game. The game (X , x0) is build from (G, v0) in time at most exponential in the
number of players and polynomial in the size of the transistion system of A.
The proof will be organised in three steps whose respective proofs will rely
on the previous step(s): (i) given a gain profile p ∈ {0, 1}|Π|, given Lk = {λk(v) |
v ∈ V X} for some k ∈ N and given some v ∈ V X , we show that we can decide in
the required complexity the existence of a play which is λk-consistent, beginning
in v and with gain profile p; (ii) given Lk for some k ∈ N, we show that the
computation of Lk+1 can be performed within the required complexity; and
finally (iii) given x, y ∈ {0, 1}|Π|, we show that the existence of a λ∗-consistent
play beginning in x0 with a gain profile p such that x ≤ p ≤ y can be decided
within the required complexity.
– Proof of (i): Given Lk, v ∈ V X and p ∈ {0, 1}|Π|, we want to know if there
exists a play ρ ∈ PlaysX(v) which is λ
k-consistent and with gain profile p.
If a play ρ is such that gX(ρ) = p, then for each i ∈ Π such that pi = 1,
the condition of being a λk-consistent play is satisfied. For those such that
pi = 0, for each n ∈ N such that ρn ∈ V Xi , g
X
i (ρ≥n) = 0 should be greater
than λk(ρn). This condition is satisfied if and only if for each ρn ∈ V Xi ,
λk(ρn) 6= 1. Thus, we remove from (X , x0) all vertices (and all related edges)
v ∈ V Xi such that λ
k(v) = 1, for each player i such that pi = 0. Then, we
only have to check if there exists a play ρ which begin in v and with gain
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profile p in this modified extended reachability game. This can be done in
O(2|Π| · (|V X |+ |EX |)) ([8, Lemma 23]), thus this procedure runs in time at
most exponential in the number of players and polynomial in the size of the
transition system of A.
– Proof of (ii): Given Lk, we want to compute Lk+1. For each v ∈ V X ,
λk+1(v) = maxv′∈Succ(v)min{g
X
i (ρ) | ρ ∈ PlaysX(v
′)∧ρ |= λk} (by assuming
that v ∈ V Xi ). Thus for each v
′ ∈ Succ(v), we have to compute min =
min{gXi (ρ) | ρ ∈ PlaysX(v
′)∧ρ |= λk}. Butmin = 0 if and only if there exists
ρ ∈ PlaysX(v
′) which is λk-consistent and such that gXi (ρ) = 0. Thus for each
p ∈ {0, 1}|Π| such that pi = 0, we use point (i) to decide if min = 0. From
that follows a procedure which runs in O(|V X |·|V X |·2|Π|·2|Π|·(|V X |+|EX |))
(running time at most exponential in the number of players and polynomial
in the size of the transition system A).
– Proof of (iii): It remains to prove that the existence of a λ∗-consistent play
beginning in x0 with a gain profile p such that x ≤ p ≤ y can be decided
within the required complexity. In order to do so, we evaluate the complexity
to obtain λ∗. First, we build L0 = {λ0(v) = 0 | v ∈ V X} in O(|V X |) time.
Then, we apply point (ii) at most |V |·2|Π| times (by Lemma 3) to obtain L∗.
Given x, y ∈ {0, 1}|Π|, we consider each p ∈ {0, 1}|Π| such that x ≤ p ≤ y
(at most 2|Π| such ones) and we use point (i) to check if there exists a play
which begins in x0 with gain profile p and which is λ
∗-consistent. This can
be done in running time at most exponential in the number of players and
polynomial in the size of the transition system of A.
We conclude the proof by applying Proposition 3.
5 Application to Timed Games
In this section, we are interested in models which are enriched with clocks and
clock guards in order to consider time elapsing. Timed automata [19] are well
known among such models. We recall some of their classical concepts, then we
explain how (turn-based) timed games derive from timed automata.
5.1 Timed automata and timed games
In this section, we use the following notations. The set C = {c1, . . . , ck} denotes
a set of k clocks. A clock valuation is a function ν : C → R+. The set of clock
valuation is depicted by CV . Given a clock valuation ν, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we
sometimes write νi instead of ν(ci). Given a clock valuation ν and d ∈ R+, ν+d
denote the clock valuation ν + d : C → R+ such that (ν + d)(ci) = ν(ci) + d
for each ci ∈ C. A guard is any finite conjunctions of expressions of the form
ci ⋄ x where ci is a clock, x ∈ N is a natural number and ⋄ is one of the symbols
{≤, <,=, >,≥}. We denote by G the set of guards. Let g be a guard and ν be
a clock valuation, notation ν |= g means that (ν1, . . . , νk) satisfies g. A reset
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Y ∈ 2C indicates which clocks are reset to 0. We denote by [Y ← 0]ν the valua-
tion ν′ such that for each c ∈ Y , ν′(c) = 0 and for each c ∈ C\Y , ν′(c) = ν(c).
A timed automaton (TA) is a tupple (A, ℓ0) = (Σ,L,→, C) where: (i) Σ
is a finite alphabet; (ii) L is a finite set of locations ; (iii) C is a finite set of
clocks ; (iv) →⊆ L × Σ ×G × 2C × L a finite set of transitions; and (v) ℓ0 ∈ L
an initial location. Additionnaly, we may equipped a timed automaton with a
set of players and partition the locations between them. It results in a players
partitioned timed automaton.
Definition 11 ((Reachability) Players partitioned timed automaton).
A players partioned timed automaton (PPTA) (A, ℓ0) = (Σ,L,→, C,Π, (Li)i∈Π)
is a timed automaton equipped with: (i) Π a finite set of players and (ii) (Li)i∈Π
a partition of the locations between the players.
If (A, ℓ0) is equipped with a target set Goali ⊆ L for each player i ∈ Π, we
call it a reachability PPTA.
The semantic of a timed automaton (A, ℓ0) is given by its associated tran-
sition system TA = (Σ, V,E) where: (i) V = L × CV is a set of vertices of
the form (ℓ, ν) where ℓ is a location and ν : C → R+ is a clock valuation; and
(ii) E ⊆ V × Σ × V is such that ((ℓ, ν), a, (ℓ′, ν′)) ∈ E if (ℓ, a, g, Y, ℓ′) ∈→ for
some g ∈ G and some Y ∈ 2C , and there exists d ∈ R+ such that: (1) for each
x ∈ X\Y : ν′(x) = ν(x) + d (time elapsing); (2) for each x ∈ Y : ν′(x) = 0
(clocks resetting); (3) ν + d |= g (respect of the guard).
In the same way, the semantic of a PPTA (A, ℓ0) is given by its associated
game (GA, v0).
Definition 12 ((Reachability) Timed games GA). Let (A, ℓ0) = (Σ,L,→
, C,Π, (Li)i∈Π) be a PPTA, its associated game (GA, v0) = (AA, (gi)i∈Π), called
timed game, is such that: (i) AA = (Σ, V,E,Π, (Vi)i∈Π) where TA = (Σ, V,E)
is the associated transition system of (A, ℓ0) and, for each i ∈ Π, (ℓ, ν) ∈ Vi if
and only if ℓ ∈ Li; (ii) for each i ∈ Π, gi : PlaysAA → {0, 1} is a gain function;
(iii) v0 = (ℓ0,0) where 0 is the clock valuation such that for all c ∈ C, 0(c) = 0.
If (A, ℓ0) is a reachability PPTA, its associated timed game is a reachability
game (GA, v0) = (AA, (gi)i∈Π, (Fi)i∈Π) such that for each i ∈ Π, (ℓ, ν) ∈ Fi if
and only if ℓ ∈ Goali. We call this game a reachability timed game.
Thus, in a timed game, when it is the turn of Player i to play, if the play
is in location ℓ, he has to choose a delay d ∈ R+ and a next location ℓ′ such
that (ℓ, a, g, Y, ℓ′) ∈→ for some a ∈ Σ, g ∈ G and Y ∈ 2C . If the choice of d
respects the guard g, then the choice of Player i is valid: the clock valuation
evolves according to the past clock valuation, d and Y and location ℓ′ is reached.
Then, the play continues.
5.2 Regions and region games
In this section, we consider a bisimulation equivalence on TA (the classical time-
abstract bisimulation from [19]) which allows us to solve the constrained exis-
tence in the quotient of the original timed game (the region game). All along
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this section we use the following notations. We denote by xi the maximum value
in the guard for clock ci. For all, positive number d ∈ R+, ⌊d⌋ is the integral
part of d and d is fractional part of d.
Definition 13 (≈ and region).
– Two clock valuations ν and ν′ are equivalent (written ν ≈ ν′) iff: (i) ⌊νi⌋ =
⌊ν′i⌋ or νi, ν
′
i > xi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}; (ii) νi = 0 iff ν
′
i, for all i ∈
{1, . . . , k} with vi ≤ xi and (iii) νi ≤ νj iff ν′i ≤ ν
′
j for all i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
with νj ≤ xj and νi ≤ xi.
– We extend the equivalence relation to the states (≈⊆ V ×V ) : (ℓ, ν) ≈ (ℓ′, ν′)
iff ℓ = ℓ′ and ν ≈ ν′;
– A region r is an equivalence class for some v ∈ V : r = [v]≈.
This equivalence relation on clocks and its extension to states of TA is usual
and the following result is well known [19].
Lemma 4 ([19]). Let (A, ℓ0) be a TA, ≈⊆ V ×V is a bisimulation equivalence
on TA.
It means that if (GA, v0) is a (reachability) timed game, ≈ is a bisimulation
equivalence on it. Moreover, it respects the partition. Thus, we can consider the
(reachability) quotient game of this game. We call this game the (reachability)
region game. Notice that ≈ respects the target sets, so the reachability quotient
game is defined as in Definition 9.
Definition 14 ((Reachability) region game). Let (GA, v0) be a (reachabil-
ity) timed game and ≈⊆ V ×V be the bisimulation equivalence defined in Defini-
tion 13, its associated (reachability) region game is its associated (reachability)
quotient game ( ˜˜GA, [v0]).
We recall [19] that the size of ˜˜TA, i.e., its number of states (regions) and
edges, is in O((|V | + | → |) · 2|δ(A)|) where δ(A) is the binary encoding of the
constants (guards and costs) appearing in A. Thus | ˜˜TA| is in O(2| A |) where | A |
takes into account the locations, edges and constants of A. From this follows the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. The (reachability) region game ( ˜˜GA, [v0]) is a finite (reachability)
game.
Finally, in light of the construction of the reachability region game, the bisim-
ulation equivalence ≈ respects the gain functions of the reachability timed game
and of the reachability region game.
Lemma 6. Given (GA, v0) = (AA, (gi)i∈Π, (Fi)i∈Π) be a reachability timed game
and ( ˜˜GA, [v0]) = (
˜˜AA, (˜˜gi)i∈Π , (
˜˜
Fi)i∈Π) its associated region game, ≈ respects
the gain functions.
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Remark 3. Let A = (Σ,L,→, C) be a timed automaton, TA = (Σ, V,E) be its
associated transition system and ≈ be the bissimulation equivalence on TA as
defined in Definition 13, we have that ((ℓ, ν), a, (ℓ′, ν′)) ∈ E if and only if there
exist g ∈ G, Y ∈ 2C and d ∈ R+ such that (ℓ, a, g, Y, ℓ′) ∈→, ν′ = [Y ← 0](v+d)
and v + d |= g. Thus, we abstract the notion of time elapsing in the edeges of
the transition system.
Then, since≈ is a bisimulation equivalence on TA, for all ((ℓ1, ν1), a, (ℓ′1, ν
′
1)) ∈
E and for all (ℓ2, ν2) ∈ V such that (ℓ1, ν1) ≈ (ℓ2, ν2), there exists (ℓ′2, ν
′
2) ∈ V
such that ((ℓ2, ν2), a, (ℓ
′
2, ν
′
2)) ∈ E and (ℓ
′
1, ν
′
1) ≈ (ℓ
′
2, ν
′
2). The time elapsing be-
tween ν1 and ν
′
1 is not necessarly the same as between ν2 and ν
′
2. Thus, ≈ is a
timed abstract bisimulation in the classical way [19].
5.3 Complexity results
Theorem 3. Given a reachability PPTA (A, ℓ0) and x, y ∈ {0, 1}|Π|, the con-
strained existence problem in reachability timed games is EXPTIME-complete.
The EXPTIME-hardness is due to a reduction from countdown games and
is inspired by the one provided in [7, Section 6.3.3]. Thus, we only prove the
EXPTIME-easiness.
Proof (EXPTIME-easiness). Given a PPTA (A, ℓ0) with target sets (Goali)i∈Π
and given x, y ∈ {0, 1}|Π|. Thanks to Theorem 1, it is equivalent to solve this
problem in the reachability region game. Moreover, the size of the reachability
region game is exponential, because its transition system ˜˜TA is exponential in
the size of A, but not in the number of players. Then, since the reachability
region game is a finite reachability game (Lemma 5), we can apply Theorem 2.
It causes an exponential blow-up in the number of players but is polynomial in
the size of transition system ˜˜TA. Thus, this entire procedure runs in (simple)
exponential time in the size of the PPTA (A, ℓ0) .
Notice that, since there always exists an SPE in a finite reachability game [20],
there always exists an SPE in the region game and so in the reachability timed
game (Theorem 1).
5.4 Time-bounded reachability, Zenoness and other extensions
In this paper, we focus on (qualitative) reachability timed games, and ignore the
effect of Zeno behaviors4. Nevertheless we believe that our approach is rather
robust and can be extended to richer objectives and take into account Zeno
behaviors. In the following paragraphs, we try to briefly explain how this could
be achieve.
4 A run ρ = (ℓ0, ν0)
d1,a1−−−→ (ℓ1, ν1)
d2,a2−−−→ . . . in a timed automaton is said timed-
divergent if the sequence (
∑
j≤i
dj)i diverges. A timed automaton is non-Zeno if
any finite run can be extended into a time-divergent run [6].
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Time-bounded reachability. A natural extension of our framework would be to
equip the objective of each player with a time-bound. Player i aims at visit-
ing Fi within TBi time-units. We believe that this time-bound variant of our
constrained problem is decidable. Indeed, for each player, his time-bound reach-
ability objective can easily be encoded via a deterministic timed automaton (on
finite timed words) Ai. Given a timed game Gb equipped with a timed-bounded
objective for each player (described via Ai), we could, via standart product con-
struction build a new reachability timed game (without time-bound) G. Solving
the constrained existence problem (with time-bound) in Gb is equivalent to solv-
ing the constrained existence problem (of Definition 1) in G (the constrained
being encoded in the Ai’s). This approach could extend to any property that
can be expressed via a deterministic timed automaton.
Towards ω-regular objectives. Let us briefly explain how our approach could
be adapted to prove the decidability of the constrained existence problem for
timed games with ω-regular objectives. For the sake of clarity, we here focus
on parity objective. First, let us notice that the results of Section 3 (including
Theorem 1) apply to a general class of games, including infinite games with clas-
sical ω-regular objectives such as parity. An algorithm to decide the constrained
existence problem (Definition 1) on parity on finite games can be found in [20]
via translation into tree automata. Equipped with these two tools, we believe
that we could adapt the definitions and results of Section 5 to obtain the de-
cidability of the constrained existence problem for parity timed games. Notice
that, in order to obtain our complexity results for finite reachability games, we
use other simpler tools than tree automata.
About Zenoness. In the present paper, we allow a player to win (or to prevent
other players to win) even if his strategy is responsible of Zeno behaviors. In [1],
the authors propose an elegant approach to blame a player that would prevent
divergence of time. The main idea is to transform the ω-regular objective of
each player into another one which will make him lose if he blocks the time. We
believe that this idea could be exploited in our framework in order to prevent
from winning a “blocking time player”.
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A Proofs of Section 3
For the sake of clarity, we denote PlaysA˜, HistA˜ and Histi A˜ by P˜lays, H˜ist and
H˜isti respectively.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, when we consider a history h = h0 . . . hn for some n ∈ N, the
length of h, denoted by |h|, is its number of vertices.
This section is devoted to prove Proposition 1. Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) be a
game and ∼ be a bisimulation equivalence on (G, v0) which respects the partition
and such that for each ρ and ρ′ in Plays, if ρ ∼ ρ′ then g(ρ) = g(ρ′).
If there exists an SPE τ in (G, v0) which is uniform and such that g(〈τ〉v0 ) = p,
clearly there exists an SPE σ in (G, v0) such that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p.
The difficult part is the other implication: if there exists an SPE σ in (G, v0)
such that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p, then there exists an SPE τ in (G, v0) which is uniform
and such that g(〈τ〉v0 ) = p. Let us prove it.
Let σ be an SPE in (G, v0) such that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p. In order to build τ , we
need some additional material and notations that we explain below.
– for each h ∈ Hist(v0): [h] = {h′ ∈ Hist(v0) | h ∼ h′};
– Cn = {[h] | h ∈ Hist(v0) ∧ |h| = n};
– R :
⋃
n∈N
Cn → Hist(v0) ∪ {⊥} which allow us to indentify a witness for each
class;
– P : Hist(v0)→ {0, 1}
Inductive construction of R and P The first step, is to choose in a proper
way a witness to each each class [h]. We proceed by induction on the length of
histories. Moreover, we claim that the following properties are satisfied all along
the inductive construction.
-35pt-35pt
Invariant 1: For each hv ∈ Hist(v0) such that R([hv]) 6=⊥,
hv ∼ R([hv]).
Invariant 2: For each hv ∈ Hist(v0) such that R([hv]) 6=⊥ and |hv| > 1,
R([hv]) = R([h]) Last(R([hv])).5
Invariant 3: For each hv ∈ Hist(v0) such that R([hv]) 6=⊥,
h′v′ ≤ R([hv]) < h′〈σ↾h′〉v′
for some h′v′ such that P (h′v′) = 1.
5 If h = h0 . . . hn for some n ∈ N, Last(h) = hn.
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Before beginning the induction, we initialize P and R in the following way:
for all C ∈
⋃
n∈N C
n, R(C) =⊥ and for all h ∈ Hist(v0), P (h) = 0.
– For n = 1 : C1 = {[v0]}, we define P (v0) = 1. Then , for each h such that
v0 ≤ h < 〈σ〉v0 , we define R([h]) = h. Thus, Invariant 3 is satisfied with
h′v′ = v0 and for each v0 < hv < 〈σ〉v0 , R([hv]) is defined in this step and
satisfies Invariant 2. Since R([h]) = h for each witness defined in this step,
Invariant 1 is satisfied too.
– Let us assume that these two invariant are satisfied after step k, and let us
prove it remains true after step k + 1.
– In this step, we first define R for each C ∈ Ck+1 such that R(C) =⊥.
We know that for all h1v1, h2v2 ∈ C, h1 ∼ h2 and R([h1]) = R([h2])
are already defined (i.e., 6=⊥). Moreover, by Invariant 1, h1 ∼ R([h1]), let
h = R([h1]), by bisimulation ∼, there exists v ∈ V such that h1v1 ∼ hv.
We define P (hv) = 1 and R(C) = hv. Then, for all h2v2 ∈ C, h2v2 ∼
h1v1 ∼ hv this implies that h2v2 ∼ R([h2v2]) (Inv 1 ok). For all h2v2 ∈ C,
R([h2v2]) = R(C) = hv = R([h1])v = R([h2])v = R([h2]) Last(R([h2v2]))
(Inv 2 ok). Moreover, for all h2v2 ∈ C, R([h2v2]) = hv and P (hv) = 1, since
hv ≤ hv < h〈σ↾h〉v (Inv 3 ok).
Now, we extend the construction of R and P from hv in the following way:
∀h′v′ ∈ Hist(v0) such that hv < h′v′ < h〈σ↾h〉v we define R([h′v′]) = h′v′. ⋆
Now, we have to prove that the invariants remains satisfied for all these new
defined classes.
• ∀hv ∈ [h′v′]: hv ∼ h′v′ = R([h′v′]) = R([hv]) (Inv 1 ok);
• ∀hv ∈ [h′v′], we have that hv ∼ h′v′ thus: R([hv]) = R([h′v′]) =
R([h′]) Last(R([h′v′])) (by construction ⋆). Thus, since h ∼ h′: R([h′]) =
R([h]) (Inv 2 ok).
• ∀hv ∈ [h′v′], we have by construction ⋆ that P (hv) = 1 and hv < h′v′ <
h〈σ↾h〉v. Since h′v′ = R([h′v′]) and R([h′v′]) = R([hv]) (h′v′ ∼ hv), we
are done (Inv 3 ok).
Construction of τ To build the uniform strategy profile τ , we proceed as
follows: for all n ∈ N, for all C ∈ Cn, for all h ∈ C, by assuming that Last(h) ∈ Vi:
– If R([h]) = h (h is a witness, thus we want to follow σ): τi(h) = σi(h);
– If R([h]) 6= h (we simulate σ): we know by Invariant 1 that h ∼ R([h]), thus
in particular Last(h) ∼ Last(R([h])), by bisimulation ∼, there exists x ∈ V
such that Last(h)x ∼ Last(R([h]))σi(R([h])). Thus, we define τi(h) = x.
We state now, some properties about τ and σ. First, we define Wit = {h ∈
Hist(v0) | ∃C ∈
⋃
n∈N C
n st. R(C) = h}.
Lemma 7. For all h ∈ Hist(v0) such that h ∈ Wit and Last(h) ∈ Vi: τi(h) =
σi(h).
Proof. This assertion is true due to the construction of τ .
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Lemma 8. For all h, h′ ∈ Hist(v0) such that h ∼ h′: τi(h) ∼ τi(h′) by assuming
that Last(h) ∈ Vi.
Notice that, since ∼ respects the partition, if Last(h) ∈ Vi then Last(h′) ∈ Vi,
and vice versa.
Proof. Let h, h′ ∈ Hist(v0) such that h ∼ h′ and Last(h) ∈ Vi for some i ∈ Π
then Last(h′) ∈ Vi. We have that R([h]) = R([h′]). By construction, τi(h) ∼
σi(R([h])) and τi(h
′) ∼ σi(R([h
′])), by transitivity, we have: τi(h) ∼ τi(h
′). ⊓⊔
Lemma 9. For all h ∈ Wit, hτi(h) ∈ Wit (by assuming that Last(h) ∈ Vi for
some i ∈ Π).
Proof. Let h ∈ Wit, such that Last(h) ∈ Vi for some i ∈ Π . Since h ∈ Wit, by
Invariant 3, there exists h′v′ ∈ Hist(v0) such that:
h′v′ ≤ h < h′〈σ↾h′〉v′ .
Thus, we have that
h′v′ ≤ hσi(h) < h
′〈σ↾h′〉v′ .
It follows by construction of R, that hσi(h) ∈ Wit. Moreover, h ∈ Wit implies
that τi(h) = σi(h) (by Lemma 7). Thus, hτi(h) ∈Wit. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. For all hv ∈Wit, 〈σ↾h〉v = 〈τ↾h〉v.
Proof. Let hv ∈Wit, let ρ = 〈σ↾h〉v and let ρ = 〈τ↾h〉v. Let us prove by induction
that for all n ∈ N:
1. ρn = ρn;
2. hρ0 . . . ρn ∈Wit.
For n = 0, ρ0 = v and ρ0 = v. And by hypothesis, hv ∈Wit. Let us assume
that both assertions are satisfied for all n such that n ≤ k. Let us prove that it
remains true for n = k + 1. By assuming that ρk ∈ Vi,
1.
ρk+1 = τi(hρ0 . . . ρk)
= τi(hρ0 . . . ρk) By IH, ρ0 . . . ρk = ρ0 . . . ρk
= σi(hρ0 . . . ρk) By IH, hρ0 . . . ρk ∈Wit and by Lemma 7
= ρk+1.
2. By IH, hρ0 . . . ρk ∈Wit, moreover we have that, by Lemma 7:
hρ0 . . . ρkρk+1 = hρ0 . . . ρkσi(hρ0 . . . ρk) = hρ0 . . . ρkτi(hρ0 . . . ρk)
And by Lemma 9, we can conclude that hρ0 . . . ρkτi(hρ0 . . . ρk) ∈Wit. ⊓⊔
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Proof that τ is an uniform SPE with gain profile p There is still to prove
that τ is an uniform SPE in (G, v0) such that g(〈τ〉v0 ) = p. By Lemma 8, τ is
uniform, let us prove this is an SPE with the gain profile p.
Proof. First, since v0 ∈ Wit and by Lemma 10, we have that 〈σ〉v0 = 〈τ〉v0 .
Thus, in particular, g(〈τ〉v0 ) = g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p.
By absurdum, let us assume that τ is not an SPE in (G, v0). It means that
there exist hv ∈ Hist(v0), i ∈ Π and a strategy τ ′i of Player i in (G↾h, v) such
that τ ′i is a profitable deviation of τi↾h, i.e.,
gi(h〈τ↾h〉v) < gi(h〈τ
′
i , τ−i↾h〉v). (1)
Let h′v′ = R([hv]) = R([h]) Last(R([hv])) by Invariant 2.
First step: Let ρ = 〈τ↾h〉v and ρ′ = 〈τ↾h′〉v′ , let us prove by induction that for
all n ∈ N:
1. ρn ∼ ρ′n;
2. h′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
n ∈Wit.
For n = 0, we have that ρ0 = v and ρ
′
0 = v
′, thus v ∼ v′ since hv ∼ h′v′.
Moreover, h′v′ ∈Wit by hypothesis. Let us assume that these two properties are
satisfied for all n such that n ≤ k, let us prove they remain true for n = k + 1.
Let us assume that ρk ∈ Vj for some j ∈ Π , since ∼ respects the partition and
due to the fact that ρk ∼ ρ′k by IH, we have that ρ
′
k ∈ Vj .
1.
ρk+1 = τj(hρ0 . . . ρk)
∼ τj(h
′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
k) By IH, hρ0 . . . ρk ∼ h
′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
k and by Lemma 8
= ρ′k+1
2. h′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
kρ
′
k+1 = h
′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
kτi(h
′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
k), h
′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
k ∈ Wit by IH, thus by
Lemma 9: h′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
kτi(h
′ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
k) ∈Wit.
It allows us to state by (1) that hρ ∼ h′ρ′, thus by hypothesis on ∼, we have
that
g(h〈τ↾h〉v) = g(h
′〈τ↾h′〉v′ ). (2)
By (2) and Lemma 7, we have that 〈τ↾h′〉v′ = 〈σ↾h′〉v′ and thus:
g(h′〈τ↾h′〉v′) = g(h
′〈σ↾h′〉v′). (3)
Second step: Let ρ = 〈τ ′i , τ−i↾h〉v, we will build a strategy τ˜i in (G↾h′ , v
′) such
that ρ ∼ 〈τ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′ . Let p˜ ∈ Histi(v′) and let us assume that p˜ = p˜0 . . . p˜m for
some m ∈ N.
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– If p˜ ∼ ρ0 . . . ρm, then ρm ∈ Vi (∼ respects the partition) and ρm+1 =
τ ′i(ρ0 . . . ρm). Thus, by ∼ there exists x ∈ V such that p˜x ∼ ρ0 . . . ρmρm+1.
We define τ˜i(p˜) = x. Thus, τ˜i(p˜0 . . . ρ˜m) ∼ τ
′
i(ρ0 . . . ρm).
– Otherwise, we define τ˜i(p˜) = x for some x ∈ Succ(p˜m).
Let ρ˜ = 〈τ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′ , let us prove that for all n ∈ N, ρ˜n ∼ ρn. For n = 0,
ρ˜0 = v
′ and ρ0 = v, since h
′v′ ∼ hv, v′ ∼ v. Let us assume that this property is
true for all n ≤ k and let us prove it remains true for n = k + 1.
– If ρ˜k ∈ Vi, then since ρ˜k ∼ ρk by IH, ρk ∈ Vi (∼ respects the partition). It
follows:
ρ˜k+1 = τ˜i(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k)
∼ τ ′i(ρ0 . . . ρk) By IH, ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k ∼ ρ0 . . . ρk and by construction of τ˜i
= ρk+1.
– If ρ˜k ∈ Vj (j 6= i), as previously ρk ∈ Vj . Thus:
ρ˜k+1 = τj↾h′ (ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) = τj(h
′ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k)
∼ τj(hρ0 . . . ρk) By IH, h
′ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k ∼ hρ0 . . . ρk and by Lemma 8
= ρk+1.
From this we have that hρ ∼ h′ρ˜ and in particular:
gi(h〈τ
′
i , τ−i↾h〉v) = gi(h
′〈τ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′). (4)
Third step: From τ˜i, we build σ˜i in (G↾h′ , v′) which is a profitable devition of
σi↾h′ . Let p ∈ Histi(v′)
– If h′p ∈ Wit, we consider R([h′pτ˜i(p)]) = R([h′p]) Last(R([h′pτ˜i(p)]) by
Invariant 2. Let x = Last(R([h′pτ˜i(p)]). We definie σ˜i(p) = x, in particular,
we have that R([h′pτ˜i(p)]) = R([h′p])σ˜i(p) and thus R([h′p])σ˜i(p) ∈Wit.
– If h′p 6∈Wit, we define σ˜i(p) = τ˜i(p).
Let π = 〈σ˜i, σ−i↾h′〉v′ and π′ = 〈σ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′ . Let us prove that for all n ∈ N:
1. πn = π
′
n;
2. h′π0 . . . πn ∈Wit
For n = 0, we have that π0 = v
′ = π′0. Moreover, h
′v′ ∈ Wit by hypothesis.
Let us assume that these two properties are true for all n ≤ k and let us prove
that they remain true for n = k + 1.
– If πk ∈ Vi, then by IH, πk = π′k ∈ Vi.
1.
πk+1 = σ˜i(π0 . . . πk)
= σ˜i(π
′
0 . . . π
′
k) By IH, π0 . . . πk = π
′
0 . . . π
′
k.
= π′k+1
22 T. Brihaye and A. Goeminne
2.
h′π0 . . . πkπk+1 = h
′π0 . . . πkσ˜i(π0 . . . πk)
= R([h′π0 . . . πk])σ˜i(π0 . . . πk) By IH, h
′π0 . . . πk ∈Wit
∈Wit By construction of σ˜i.
– If πk ∈ Vj (j 6= i), then by IH, πk = π′k ∈ Vj .
1.
πk+1 = σj(h
′π0 . . . πk)
= τj(h
′π0 . . . πk) By IH, h
′π0 . . . πk ∈Wit and by Lemma 7
= τj(h
′π′0 . . . π
′
k) By IH
= π′k+1.
2.
h′π0 . . . πkπk+1 = h
′π0 . . . πkσj(h
′π0 . . . πk)
= h′π0 . . . πkτj(h
′π0 . . . πk) By IH, h
′π0 . . . πk ∈Wit and by Lemma 7
∈Wit By Lemma 9
Thus, we can conclude that:
gi(h
′〈σ˜i, σ−i↾h′〉v′) = gi(h
′〈σ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′). (5)
Now, we want to prove that π′ = 〈σ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′ ∼ ρ˜ = 〈τ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′ . Let us
recall, that from the second step, we know that ρ˜ ∼ ρ = 〈τ ′i , τ−i↾h〉v. Let us prove
that for all n ∈ N: π′n ∼ ρ˜n.
For n = 0: π′0 = v
′ = ρ˜0. Let us assume that this property is true for all
n ≤ k and let tus prove that it remains true for n = k + 1.
– If π′k ∈ Vi then, by IH we have that π
′
k ∼ ρ˜k and so ρ˜k ∈ Vi.
π′k+1 = σ˜i(π
′
0 . . . π
′
k)
= Last(R([h′π′0 . . . π
′
k τ˜i(π
′
0 . . . π
′
k)])) h
′π′0 . . . π
′
k ∈Wit
∼ τ˜i(π
′
0 . . . π
′
k)
By IH, we know that π′0 . . . π
′
k ∼ ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k and by hypothesis, we have that
ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k ∼ ρ0 . . . ρk. It follows from the construction of τ˜i that τ˜i(π′0 . . . π
′
k) ∼
τ ′i(ρ0 . . . ρk) and τ˜i(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) ∼ τ
′
i(ρ0 . . . ρk). Thus, by transitivity, π
′
k+1 ∼
τ˜i(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) = ρ˜k+1.
– If π′k ∈ Vj (j 6= i) then as previously ρ˜k ∈ Vj .
π′k+1 = τj(h
′π′0 . . . π
′
k)
∼ τj(h
′ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) By IH, h
′π′0 . . . π
′
k ∼ h
′ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k and by Lemma 8
= ρ˜k+1.
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Thus h′π′ ∼ h′ρ˜ and it follows that:
gi(h
′〈σ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′) = gi(h
′〈τ˜i, τ−i↾h′〉v′). (6)
Fourth step: putting all together
By (1),(2),(3),(4),(5) and (6), we can conclude that
gi(h
′〈σ↾h′〉v′) < gi(h
′〈σ˜i, σ−i↾h′〉v′).
Thus, there exists a profitable deviation of σi↾h′ for Player i in (G↾h′ , v′). This
is impossible, since σ is an SPE in (G, v0). ⊓⊔
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we prove Theorem 1. In order to do so, we prove the two impli-
cations of the equivalence in two different propositions.
Proposition 4. Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) be a game and (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π)
its associated quotient game where ∼ is a bisimulation equivalence on (G, v0). If
∼ respects the partition and the gain functions, we have that: if there exists an
SPE σ in (G, v0) such that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p for some p ∈ {0, 1}
|Π| then there exists
an SPE τ in (G˜, [v0]) such that g˜(〈τ〉[v0 ]) = p.
Proof. Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) be a game and (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π) its as-
sociated quotient game where ∼ is a bisimulation equivalence on (G, v0) which
respects the partition and the gain functions. We assume that there exists an
SPE σ in (G, v0) such that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p for some p ∈ {0, 1}.
Without loss of generality, we can assume thanks to Proposition 1 that σ is
uniform, i.e., for all histories h,h′ ∈ Hist(v0) such that Last(h) ∈ Vi ⇔ Last(h′) ∈
Vi, σi(h) ∼ σi(h′).
Let h˜ ∈ H˜ist([v0]) be a history in the quotient game, by bisimulation ∼q⊆
V × V˜ , there exists h = h0 . . . hn ∈ Hist(v0) such that h ∼q h˜ = [h0] . . . [hn]. Let
v ∈ V be the vertex such that σi(h) = v, by assuming that Last(h) ∈ Vi. We
have that v ∼q [v] and, we define τi(h˜) = [v].
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CLAIM 1: ∀h˜ ∈ H˜ist([v0]), ∀h ∈ Hist(v0) such that h ∼q h˜, if Last(h) ∈ Vi,
σi(h) ∼q τi(h˜).
Proof: Let h˜ ∈ H˜ist([v0]) and h ∈ Hist(v0) such that Last(h) ∈ Vi for some
i ∈ Π and h ∼q h˜. By construction of τ , there exists h′ ∈ Histi(v0) such that
h′ ∼q h˜ and τi(h˜) = [σi(h′)]. If h ∼q h˜ and h′ ∼q h˜, we have that h ∼ h′.
Thus, by uniformity of σ, σi(h) ∼ σi(h′) and in particular [σi(h)] = [σi(h′)]. In
conclusion, σi(h) ∼q [σi(h)] = [σi(h′)] = τi(h˜). ⊓⊔
Let ρ = 〈σ〉v0 and ρ˜ = 〈τ〉[v0]. Let us prove that: ∀n ∈ N ρn ∼q ρ˜n. Thus,
ρ ∼q ρ˜ and since ∼ respects the gain functions, g(ρ) = g˜(ρ˜) = p.
For n = 0: ρ0 = v0 ∼q [v0] = ρ˜0. We assume that this is true for all
n ≤ k and we prove it remains true for n = k + 1. By induction hypothesis,
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we have that ρ0 . . . ρk ∼q ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k. By ∼q, ρk ∈ Vi if and only if ρ˜k ∈ V˜i. Thus,
ρk+1 = σi(ρ0 . . . ρk) ∼q τi(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) = ρ˜k+1 by Claim 1.
To conclude, we have to prove that τ is an SPE in (G˜, [v0]). Ad absurdum,
we assume that there exists h˜v˜ ∈ H˜ist([v0]) such that there exists a player i ∈ Π
and a profitable deviation τ ′i of τi↾h˜ in (G˜↾h˜, v˜), i.e.,
g˜i(h˜〈τ↾h˜〉v˜) < g˜i(h˜〈τ
′
i , τ−i↾h˜〉v˜). (7)
By bisimulation ∼q, there exists hv ∈ Hist(v0) such that hv ∼q h˜v˜. We prove
that Player i has a profitable deviation of σi↾h in (G↾h, v). From which a contra-
diction follows since σ has to be an SPE in (G, v0).
We build the profitable deviation σ′i. Let p ∈ Histi(v) a history such that
p = vp1p2 . . . pm for some m ∈ N. By bisimulation ∼q, there exists a unique p˜
such that p = [v][p1] . . . [pm] and thus p ∼q p˜. Let r ∈ V˜ be such that τ
′
i(p˜) = r.
By bisimulation ∼q, there exists x ∈ V such that ρmx ∼q [ρm]r. We define
σ′i(p) = x. In particular, σ
′
i(p) ∼q τ
′
i(p˜).
Let ρ = 〈σ′i, σ−i↾h〉v = vρ1ρ2 . . . and ρ˜ = 〈τ
′
i , τ−i↾h˜〉v˜ = v˜ρ˜1ρ˜2 . . .. Let us show
by induction that for all n, ρn ∼q ρ˜n. It means that hρ ∼q h˜ρ˜ and since ∼q
respects the gain functions,
gi(h〈σ
′
i, σ−i↾h〉v) = gi(hρ) = g˜i(h˜ρ˜) = g˜i(h˜〈τ
′
i , τ−i↾h˜〉v˜). (8)
For n = 0: ρ0 = v ∼q v˜ = ρ˜0. Assume that this property is true for all n ≤ k
and let us prove it remains true for n = k + 1.
– First case: if ρk ∈ Vi, by IH ρk ∼q ρ˜k and thus ρ˜k ∈ V˜i. It follows that:
ρk+1 = σ
′
i(ρ0 . . . ρk)
∼q τ
′
i(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) by construction of σi and ρ0 . . . ρk ∼q ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k (IH)
= ρ˜k+1
– Seconde case: if ρk ∈ Vj with (j 6= i) then as previously ρ˜k ∈ V˜j and we
have:
ρk+1 = σj↾h(ρ0 . . . ρk)
∼q τj↾h˜(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) ρ0 . . . ρk ∼q ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k(HI) and Claim 1.
= ρ˜k+1
There is still to prove that
g˜i(h˜〈τ↾h˜〉v˜) = gi(h〈σ↾h〉v). (9)
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By Claim 1, we have that 〈σ↾h〉v ∼q 〈τ↾h˜〉v˜ thus h〈σ↾h〉v ∼q h˜〈τ↾h˜〉v˜. The fact
that ∼q respects the gain functions concludes the reasonment.
By (7),(8) and (9), we conclude that σ′i is a profitable deviation in (G↾h, v).
⊓⊔
Proposition 5. Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) be a game and (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π)
its associated quotient game where ∼ is a bisimulation equivalence on (G, v0). If
∼ respects the partition and the gain functions, we have that: if there exists an
SPE τ in (G˜, [v0]) such that g˜(〈τ〉[v0 ]) = p for some p ∈ {0, 1}
|Π| then there
exists an SPE σ in (G, v0) such that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = p.
Proof. Let (G, v0) = (A, (gi)i∈pi) be a game and (G˜, [v0]) = (A˜, (g˜i)i∈Π) its as-
sociated quotient game where ∼ is a bisimulation equivalence on (G, v0) which
respects the partition and the gain functions. We assume that there exists an
SPE τ in (G˜, [v0]) such that g˜(〈τ〉[v0 ]) = p for some p ∈ {0, 1}.
Let h ∈ Hist(v0) such that Last(h) ∈ Vi for some i ∈ Π . Thanks to bisimula-
tion ∼q, there exists a unique h˜ ∈ H˜isti([v0]) such that h ∼q h˜ (⋆). We have that
τi(h˜) = v˜ for some v˜ ∈ V˜ , thus by ∼q there exists v ∈ V such that hv ∼q h˜v˜.
We define σi(h) = v.
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CLAIM 2:
1. ∀h, h′ ∈ Hist(v0) such that h ∼ h′: σi(h) ∼ σi(h′) (if Last(h) ∈ Vi).
2. ∀h ∈ Hist(v0), ∀h˜ ∈ H˜ist([v0]) such that h ∼q h˜: σi(h) ∼q τi(h˜) (if
Last(h) ∈ Vi).
Proof:
1. By (⋆), we have that for all h ∼ h′ ∈ Histi(v0) there exists a unique h˜ such
that h ∼q h˜ and h
′ ∼q h˜. It follows by construction of σ that σi(h) ∼q τi(h˜)
and σi(h
′) ∼q τi(h˜) and thus σi(h) ∼ σi(h′). It means that σ is uniform.
2. let h ∈ Hist(v0) and h˜ ∈ H˜ist([v0]) be two histories such that Last(h) ∈ Vi
iff Last(h˜) ∈ V˜i for some i ∈ Π and such that h ∼q h˜. By construction of σ,
there exists g˜ ∈ H˜isti([v0]) such that h ∼q g˜ and σi(h) ∼q τi(g˜). But by ∼q
if h ∼q g˜ and h ∼q h˜, then g˜ = h˜. It concludes the proof.
⊓⊔
By (2) in Claim 2, we have that 〈σ〉v0 ∼q 〈τ〉[v0]. It follows, due to the fact
that ∼ respects the gain functions, that g(〈σ〉v0 ) = g˜(〈τ〉[v0 ]) = p.
Now, we prove that σ is an SPE. Ad absurdum, we assume that there exists
hv ∈ Hist(v0) , there exists i ∈ Π and there exists σ′i a profitable deviation of
σi↾h for Player i in (G↾h, v), i.e.,
gi(h〈σ↾h〉v) < gi(h〈σ
′
i, σ−i↾h〉v) (10)
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Let h˜v˜ = [h0][h1] . . . [v] with [h0] = [v0] we have that hv ∼q h˜v˜. By (2) in
Claim 2, we have that h〈σ↾h〉v ∼q h˜〈τ↾h˜〉v˜, since ∼ respects the gain functions,
it follows:
gi(h〈σ↾h〉v) = g˜i(h˜〈τ↾h˜〉v˜) (11)
To obtain the contradiction, we build τ ′i a profitable deviation of τi↾h˜ for
Player i in (G˜↾h˜, v˜).
Let ρ = 〈σ′i, σi↾h〉v, let p˜ ∈ H˜isti(v˜), we define τi(p˜) as follows:
τ ′i(p˜) =
{
[ρn+1] if p˜ < [ρ0][ρ1] . . . and Last(p˜) = [ρn]
some r ∈ Succ(Last(p˜)) otherwise
.
Let ρ˜ = 〈τ ′i , τ−i↾h˜〉v˜ and let us prove that ρ ∼q ρ˜, i.e., ∀n ∈ Nρn ∼q ρ˜n. We
proceed by induction on n.
For n = 0, ρ0 = v ∼q [v] = v˜ = ρ˜0. Let us assume that this property is true
for all n ≤ k and let us prove it remains true for n = k + 1.
– First case: If ρk ∈ Vi, then since ρk ∼q ρ˜k by IH, ρ˜k ∈ V˜i. It follows that:
ρk+1 ∼q [ρk+1] by definition of ∼q
= τ ′i(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) By IH, ρ0 . . . ρk ∼q ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k = [ρ0] . . . [ρk]
= ρ˜k+1
– Second case: If ρk ∈ Vj (with j 6= i), then as previously ρ˜k ∈ V˜j . It follows
that:
ρk+1 = σj↾h(ρ0 . . . ρk) = σj(hρ0 . . . ρk)
∼q τj(h˜ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) By IH, hρ0 . . . ρk ∼q h˜ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k and by (2) in Claim 2
= τj↾h˜(ρ˜0 . . . ρ˜k) = ρ˜k+1
Thus, ρ ∼q ρ˜ and so hρ ∼q h˜ρ˜. Since, ∼ respects the gain functions, we can
conclude that:
gi(h〈σ
′
i, σ−i↾h〉v) = g˜i(h˜〈τ
′
i , τ−i↾h˜〉v˜). (12)
By (10), (11) and (12), we can state that:
g˜i(h˜〈τ
′
i , τi↾h˜〉v˜) = gi(h〈σ
′
i, σ−i↾h〉v) > gi(h〈σ↾h〉v) = g˜i(h˜〈τ↾h˜〉v˜)
⊓⊔
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B Additional material for Section 5
In [7], Proposition 6.12 asserts that the value problem for timed games with
Bu¨chi objectives and only two clocks is EXPTIME-hard. The proof relies on the
notion of countdown game [14] which is known to be EXPTIME-complete. When
reading the proof of the latter proposition, one can easily be convinced that it
is also proved that the value problem for timed games with reachability objec-
tives and only two clocks is EXPTIME-hard. Indeed, the only accepting state
is a deadlock with a self-loop (named w∃). Moreover, one can also notice that
although the results of [7] concern concurrent games, the proof of Proposition
relies on turn-based games.
The proof of Proposition 6.12 can be slightly modified in order to prove that
the constrained existence problem in reachability timed games is EXPTIME-
hard with two clocks. The problem in the original proof beeing that Adam does
not have a reachability, but a safety objective. Given a countdown game C,
we build a reachability timed games by using nearly the same construction as
the one presented in the proof of [7, Proposition 6.12]. The difference are the
following ones.
– We replace all the guards y 6= c0 by the guards y < c0.
– We add a winning state for Adam w∀.
– From every state belonging to Eve, we add a transition to w∀ with guard
x = 0 ∧ y > c0.
The proposed transformations does not really affect the behaviors of the timed
game, in the sense that it still bisimulates closely the countdown game. The
only difference is discussed below. In the original encoding, Eve was winning if
and only if she is able to reach w∃. This could happen only when the clock y
is equal to c0. As the game is zero-sum, Adam was winning when w∃ is never
reached. In practice, as the timed game of the encoding is strongly non-zeno, in
every winning play of Adam, the clock value y eventually overtakes c0. In our new
encoding, every winning play of Adam ends up in w∀. That is the only difference.
This is important, as we can now see the timed game as a reachability time game
where both players have a reachability objective. One can be convinced that Eve
as a winning strategy (in the original timed game proposed in [7]) if and only if
there exists an SPE where only Eve achieves her objective (in the variant of the
timed game proposed above).
